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THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORICAL
ERRORS IN CITY OF BOERNE V FLORES
RUTH COLKER*
Abstract: This Article addresses the quality of the Supreme Court's
historical argument in interpreting Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment in the 1997 case City of Boerne v. Flores. The Boerne Court
referred to three historical moments relevant to understanding the
meaning of Section Five. Namely, Congress's consideration of an early
version of the Fourteenth Amendment in late 1865 and early 1866, the
congressional debate on the Fourteenth Amendment from April to June
of 1866, and the discussion of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871. Ultimately,
the Court made several fundamental errors in discussing the history of
the ratification of Section Five. The Court's narrow construction of
Congress's authority under Section Five can therefore not be justified by
the history of the Fourteenth Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
Although the Supreme Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne v.
Flores1 that Congress exceeded its authority under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment 2 in enacting the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act3 has produced extensive commentary,4 no one has assessed
* Heck-Faust Memorial Chair in Constitutional Law, Ohio State University. I would
like to thank the library staff at the Michael E. Mortiz for its vigorous efforts on my behalf
to attain the historical material that I cite in this article.
1 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
2 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act prohibits government from "substantially
burden [ing]" a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of gen-
eral applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden: "(1) is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering that compelling governmental interest." Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
4 A Westlaw search revealed that fifty-eight articles have been published that use the
term "Boerne" in their title. Those articles, of course, are only a small percentage of all of
the articles that discuss this decision. See, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differ-
ently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REV.
31; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty
After City of Boerne v. Flores, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 79; Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was
Wrong and the Court Was Right-Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L.
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the quality of the Court's historical argument in construing the
proper interpretation of Section Five. The Court, however, relied
heavily on an historical argument in support of its conclusion. It
stated boldly that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms
the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of [Section Five]." 5 In
this Article, I will argue that the Court made several fundamental er-
rors in discussing the history of the ratification of Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's narrow construction of Con-
gress's authority under Section Five in Boerne cannot be justified by
the history of that constitutional amendment.
With hindsight, we can now see that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Boerne played an important role in the federalism revolution. 6
In contrast to the broad interpretation of Congress's powers found in
the Court's 1966 decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Boerne Court
narrowly interpreted Congress's powers to enact legislation pursuant
to Section Five. Whereas the Katzenbach Court interpreted Congress's
Section Five powers to be the "same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause," 7 the Boerne Court limited Congress's
authority to "appropriate remedial measures" in which "there must be
a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved."8
REv. 793 (1998); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
AmendmentAfterCity of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REv. 163 (1998).
5 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
6 By the "federalism revolution," I mean the contraction in Congress's authority to en-
act legislation. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 521 U.S. 356 (2001) (ADA
Title I invalid as applied to the states); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(ADEA invalid as applied to the states); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (Fair Labor
Standards Act invalid as applied to states); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act invalid as
applied to states); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act invalid as
applied to the states); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regu-
latory Act invalid).
7 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
8 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. In Boerne, the Court recognized that there was language in
the opinion in Katzenbach "which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Con-
gress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 527-28. The Court held, however, that "ft]his is not a necessary inter-
pretation, however, or even the best one." Id. at 528. Instead, it reinterpreted the holding
in Katzenbach as resting on one of two possible propositions: (1) that Congress had found
that the Voting Rights Act provision was necessary as a "remedial measure" to deal with
"discrimination in governmental services;" or (2) that Congress concluded that New York's
literacy requirement, which was invalidated by the Voting Rights Act provision, "consti-
tuted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." See id. at
528-29 (quoting Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 656). Thus, it limited Congress's authority to "ap-
propriate remedial measures" in which "there must be a congruence between the means
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For the first time in more than a century, the Court concluded that
Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting legislation in the civil
rights area.9
While I agree with the Court's holding in Boerne that the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") was unconstitutional, 10 I dis-
agree with the narrow, remedial standard that the Court created in
Boerne. I have criticized this standard elsewhere, arguing that it creates
both a "crystal ball" and "phantom legislative history" problem for
Congress." Others have also criticized this and other recent Supreme
used and the ends to be achieved." Id. at 530. This "congruence" test had not been used
explicitly in prior Section Five cases and therefore reflected the narrowing scope of Sec-
tion Five under the holding in Boerne as compared with the broad "appropriate legislation"
holding in Katzenbach.
More recently, in Kime the Court acknowledged that Congress has the authority to
enact "reasonably prophylactic legislation" which "prohibits very little conduct likely to be
held unconstitutional," but, in such a case, Congress apparently needs to construct a
strong legislative record demonstrating that it had "reason to believe that state and local
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis
of age." 528 U.S. at 88-91. Strong remedial measures are apparently only appropriate
when the evil that is being addressed by the remedial measures is substantial; Congress has
the burden of demonstrating the substantiality of the evil when it acts prophylactically. Id.
The Kimel decision's emphasis on the strength of the legislative record is a contrast to the
lenient manner in which the Court examined the adequacy of the legislative record in
Katzenbach. Hence, the Court has created both substantive and procedural requirements
that Congress must now meet in order to use its Section Five powers which has resulted in
a considerable narrowing of Congress's authority under Section Five.
Not since the Court invalidated the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as exceeding Congress's
state action authority under the Fourteenth Amendment, have statutes been invalidated as
exceeding Congress's authority in the civil rights area. Compare The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883) (Civil Rights Acts exceeding Congress's power under Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments because they have no state action requirement), with Kime 528 U.S.
at 83 (ADEA exceeding Congress's power under Fourteenth Amendment because it is not
a proper prophylactic measure), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Vio-
lence Against Women Act exceeding Congress's power under the Commerce Clause be-
cause it was not regulating economic activity and under the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause it failed to meet the state action requirement).
10 See generally Ruth Colker, City of Boerne Revisited, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 455 (2002) (ar-
guing that RFRA violated the "necessary and proper clause" as well as the establishment
clause).
11 Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 80, 85-86
(2001). Problems are created for Congress when the Court takes one of the following ap-
proaches:
[u] nder the crystal ball approach, the Court effectively penalizes the enacting
Congress for failing to create a detailed legislative record, even though such a
record requirement could not reasonably have been anticipated at the mo-
ment of legislative deliberation and enactment.... Under the phantom legis-
lative history approach, the Court expresses interest in considering legislative
history when assessing constitutionality, but then establishes and applies a le-
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Court decisions as unnecessarily confining the role of Congress in en-
acting civil rights legislation.
12
In this Article, I will make a much simpler and narrower argu-
ment-that the Supreme Court in Boerne relied on a misreading of
the historical record in interpreting Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because legal commentators universally recognize that
history should play a role in constitutional interpretation, it is impor-
tant that such material receive thorough and careful consideration.
Irrespective of whether one agrees with the Court's decision on policy
grounds, it should be clear that there are serious flaws in the Court's
historical analysis.
13
The Rehnquist Court's misuse of this history is particularly trou-
bling, because Justice Scalia has been highly critical of the inconsis-
tent and arbitrary ways that legislative history has been considered in
the statutory context.14 While I disagree with the assertion of Justice
Scalia that legislative history should be discarded as inherently arbi-
trary, I do agree that such materials need to be scrutinized to make
sure that they are being examined in a way that sheds light on Con-
gress's genuine intentions or original understanding. It is disturbing
that such care has not been used by the Court's conservatives in in-
terpreting the history of Section Five.
In Part I, I will examine the debate on constitutional and statu-
tory interpretation to ascertain what criteria can be developed to ex-
gal standard for review that even a detailed legislative record could not possi-
bly satisfy.
Id.
12 See generally A. Christopher Bryant & TimothyJ. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The
Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L.
REv. 328 (2001); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54
STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001).
13 This article does not presuppose that the historical record should determine the
outcome in determining the meaning of Section Five. At most, those materials should be
one source in determining the appropriate meaning of Section Five. For further discus-
sion of my views on constitutional interpretation, see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above
AlL Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1008 n.15 (1986). I focus on the
Congressional Globe, because it has been recognized by conservatives and liberals alike as
the most authoritative source on the history of Section Five. In order for Section Five to be
ratified as a constitutional amendment, it had to be approved by two-thirds of both Houses
of Congress and two-thirds of the states. See U.S. CONST. art. V. The recorded debate in the
House and Senate is therefore some indication of the ratifiers' intentions although a com-
plete history would also discuss whatever records are available in the state legislatures. The
Court has never made reference to the debate in the state legislatures and I have made no
attempt to examine that material.
14 See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
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amine ratification history carefully in the Section Five context. In Part
II of this Article, I will critique Boerne in light of these criteria. In Part
III, I will apply these criteria to the history of Section Five to see what
we can learn through a more careful examination of the legislative
history concerning the ratifiers' intentions.
I. CRITERIA FOR CONSIDERING RATIFICATION HISTORY
Although the conservatives on the Rehnquist Court, led by Jus-
tice Scalia, have disavowed the use of legislative history to interpret
ambiguous statutes, 15 no member of the Court has disavowed the im-
portance of history in assessing the meaning of the Constitution. The
Rehnquist Court has been quite enamored with historical arguments
in the constitutional law context with Justice Kennedy, speaking for
the conservative majority in Alden v. Maine, even displaying a willing-
ness to examine the "pre-understanding" of a constitutional provi-
sion. 16 The more liberal members of the Court often refer to the Con-
15 Justice Scalia's impact on the Court in terms of his utter skepticism of the value of
legislative history is well known. His views were captured in his statement from the decision
in Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co.:
In my view a law means what its text most appropriately conveys, whatever the
Congress that enacted it might have "intended." The law is what the law says,
and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than psychoanalyzing
those who enacted it.... Moreover, even if subjective intent rather than tex-
tually expressed intent were the touchstone, it is a fiction of Jack-and-the-
Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a handful of those Senators
and Members of the House who voted for the final version of the ... Act, and
the President who signed it, were, when they took those actions, aware of the
drafting evolution that the Court describes; and if they were, that their ac-
tions in voting for or signing the final bill show that they had the same "in-
tent"....
516 U.S. 264, 279 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring). The following points about legislative
history can be discerned from this and other excerpts from Scalia's opinions about the use
of legislative history: (1) [t]he application of legislative history is hopelessly manipulable;
use of legislative history places too much power in the hands of the judiciary by allowing it
to engage in judicial statute writing; (2) [a] particular statement in legislative history does
not necessarily express the will of the majority; it may only reflect the rationale of the
speaker; and (3) [l]egislative history can be deceptive, because arguments can be buried
in legislative history--to be recited by courts in future litigation-when those arguments
were not even known to most members of Congress. Nonetheless, Scalia accepts the use of
such materials for the purposes of constitutional interpretation, failing to explore why
more safeguards exist in that context for protecting against deceptive uses of history. For
further discussion of Scalia's views, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTER-
PRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw: AN ESSAY (1997).
16 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).Justice Kennedy said:
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stitution as a "living tree" and are more interested in finding a future-
looking, rather than backward-looking, assessment of the Constitu-
tion's meaning.1 7 Even the liberals, however, sometimes find a role for
history in interpreting the Constitution.18 The most important point
We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as "Elev-
enth Amendment immunity." The phrase is convenient shorthand but some-
thing of a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives
from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the
Constitution's structure, and its history, and the authoritative interpretations
by this Court make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental as-
pect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their
admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except
as altered by tie plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amend-
ments.
Id. at 713.Justice Kennedy, therefore, did not rely on the text of the Eleventh Amendment
to resolve the question of whether Congress could subject a state to suit in a state court
without its consent. Instead, he relied on the historical evidence preceding the ratification
of the Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment.
17 Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that the Equal Protection Clause should be in-
terpreted through a more forward-looking lens than the Due Process Clause. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1161, 1163 (1988).
The Due Process Clause often looks backward; it is highly relevant to the Due
Process issue whether in existing or time-honored convention, described at
the appropriate level of generality, is violated by the practice under attack. By
contrast, the Equal Protection Clause looks forward, serving to invalidate
practices that were widespread at the time of its ratification and that were ex-
pected to endure.
Id. The Court, however, has never adopted his distinction between the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.
18 History has played a more prominent role in examining the Due Process Clause
than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 131-47 (1973) (employing historical analysis), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 490 n.4 (1954) (recognizing that public education was not widespread at the
time that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified and that compulsory school attendance
laws were not generally adopted until 1918). Both liberals and conservatives have relied on
history in interpreting Section Five. Liberals often do not use history to assist them in in-
terpreting the Equal Protection Clause in Section One, because the ratifiers had a limited
commitment to racial justice in areas we consider important today such as. education. See
generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955). By contrast, liberals use history to assist them in interpreting the
Due Process Clause in Section One. The controversy between the liberals and conserva-
tives is over the scope of the history inquiry. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190
(1986) (majority framing the proper historical question as "whether the Federal Constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence in-
validates the laws of the many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so
for a very long time."), with id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (dissent framing the ap-
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for the sake of this discussion is that the liberals have not disavowed
the relevance of history in interpreting Section Five.
One reason that extrinsic sources are considered relevant for
constitutional interpretation is that constitutional context is deliber-
ately open-ended and vague so that it can adapt to changing circum-
stances. It is difficult to amend the Constitution so courts must have
some flexibility to interpret the Constitution in a sensible fashion. We
cannot expect the people to amend the Constitution continuously to
overturn a "wrong" decision by the Court. Thus, the constitutional
text is never held to the precise standard of unambiguous meaning
that some jurists apply to statutes.
When conservatives discuss how history can be properly used in
the constitutional context, and liberals discuss how history can be
properly used in the statutory context, there is a broad range of
agreement on what constitutes proper use of history.
First, one should examine writing at the time of ratification so
that we can understand "how the text.., was originally understood."19
propriate historical question as whether all individuals to control "the nature of their inti-
mate associations with others.").
The liberals on the Court have never directly discussed why they rely more heavily on
history in interpreting the Due Process Clause than the Equal Protection Clause in Section
One. Moreover, the liberals have never explained why they rely on history in the Section
Five context-when interpreting Congress's power to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause-despite the fact that they do not rely on history to define in the first instance the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in Section One. This Article will assume that his-
tory will continue to play some role in interpreting Section Five while recognizing that one
could argue that liberals should be consistent in disavowing the usefulness of history for
determining the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in Section One and Congress's
enforcement powers with respect to the Equal Protection Clause in Section Five.
19 SCAUA, supra note 15, at 38. Scalia has argued:
In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Consti-
tution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases
an expansive rather than narrow interpretation-though not an interpreta-
tion that the language will not bear.... I will consult the writings of some
men who happened to be delegates to the Constitutional Convention-Ham-
ilton's and Madison's writings in The Federalist, for example. I do so, however,
not because they were Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and
must be the law; but rather because their writings, like those of other intelli-
gent and informed people of the time, display how the text of the Constitu-
tion was originally understood. Thus I give equal weight to Jay's pieces in The
Federalist, and to Jefferson's writings, even though neither of them was a
Framer. What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a




Boston College Law Review
We should rarely look at statements made after the ratification of a
constitutional provision.20 The important temporal period is the mo-
ment (or the immediate moment before) the ratification of constitu-
tional language.2' If we do examine statements made after ratification,
then we have to consider why those statements may be probative of
Congress's intentions at the time of ratification.
Second, we should confine ourselves to the writings of "intelli-
gent and informed people of the time" who supported ratification of
a constitutional amendment.2 2 We should consider:
(1) statements by the sponsor of the legislation or the par-
ticular provision at issue when it appears that members who
might otherwise desire to amend the bill have relied on
those statements; and (2) colloquies between the "major
players" concerning a legislative provision when it appears
that the majority of members are prepared to follow any
consensus reached by those individuals.
2
This material is found in the Congressional Record (or, as it was
called at the time-the Congressional Globe). We should not consider
statements from people who we suspect do not reflect the views of
those who supported ratification. Opponents of ratification would not
be a reliable source.
20 "(Probative legislative history] excludes any post-enactment deliberations by either
the executive or legislators. Such statements are not subject to legislative deliberation and
are not relevant. Additionally such statements almost always reflect the speaker's current
political needs and not those of the enacting legislature." AbnerJ. Mikva & Eric Lane, The
Muzak of Justice Scalia's Revolutionary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV.
121,131 (2000).
21 This first subpoint, as Scalia acknowledges, is a controversial point. Nonoriginalists,
like myself, would argue that we should not confine ourselves to the views of the people at
the time of ratification. A central aspect of a constitution's deliberate flexibility is that it be
a "living tree" and updated with the times. If we agree that it is appropriate for the consti-
tutional text not to be a legal code, so that it can flexibly consider varied constitutional
problems, it makes little sense to confine that flexibility to the time of the people who
ratified the document. If we want to confine ourselves to that time period then we might as
well have asked our forebearers to draft a more precise constitutional text. I will not join
the temporal debate in this article, but do want to note that there is an inconsistency in
recognizing the value of the flexibility of constitutional text and then limiting that
flexibility to a discrete time period from many years ago. By examining a historical source
to help us understand the meaning of Section Five, I do not want to foreclose die useful-
ness of also examining more contemporary sources.
22 See ScALIA, supra note 15, at 37-38.
23 Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone, Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its Lonely
Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561, 576 (1992).
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In sum, both liberals and conservatives appear to be able to agree
on some common guidelines for assessing historical material to ascer-
tain the "original understanding." As we will see, these tools were not
used properly to assess the history of Section Five in Boerne.
II. CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES
The issue in City of Boerne v. Flores was the constitutionality of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). RFRA prohibits the
government from "substantially burden [ing]" a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability
unless the government can justify the action under a strict scrutiny
framework.24 Congress justified its authority to enact such legislation
under its Section Five authority, arguing that it was protecting indi-
viduals' free exercise of religion. Because Congress was prohibiting
conduct which the Supreme Court had found did not violate Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment, a broad interpretation of Con-
gress's authority was necessary to conclude that RFRA was constitu-
tional.
While recognizing that the Katzenbach opinion "could be inter-
preted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that
expands the rights contained in §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"25
the Boerne Court rejected that interpretation. It rejected the "sugges-
tion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the
Fourteenth Amendment."26 Instead, it found that the "Fourteenth
Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than substantive,
nature of the Enforcement Clause."27
The Court made four serious errors in reaching this historical
conclusion. First, the Court gave inappropriate weight to statements
by the opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although it may be
true that some of these individuals opposed a broad role for Con-
gress, there is no evidence that Section Five was ever modified in re-
sponse to their concerns.
Hence, the Court correctly noted that Democrats and conserva-
tive Republicans "argued that the proposed Amendment would give
Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibil-
ity, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Consti-
24 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993).
25 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527-28 (1993).
26 Id. at 527.
27 Id. at 520.
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tution." 28 The Court quoted statements to that effect by Representa-
tives Hale, Hotchkiss, and Rogers, and Senator Stewart, but failed to
indicate whether those individuals voted for or against ultimate
ratification of Section Five. Of the Representatives quoted by the
Court, only Representative Hotchkiss voted for ratification of the
Amendment.2 9 Representative Hale abstained and Representative
Rogers voted against the measure.8 0 Professor Harris describes Repre-
sentative Rogers as an "extreme opponent" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 The Court, therefore, gave inappropriate weight to
statements by the opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, there is no evidence that Section Five was ever modified
in response to their concerns. Many of these individuals continued to
oppose Section Five, even after the language was arguably narrowed,
so that one might conclude that there were not material differences
between the early version which they opposed and the ratified ver-
sion: both versions enhanced Congress's power in ways that were not
acceptable to the opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment. By con-
trast, the Amendment's original sponsors-Representative Bingham
and Stevens-continued to support the version that was finally
ratified. Thus, they apparently considered the ratified version to grant
Congress sufficient powers so that it could enact civil rights legislation
in the future.
Third, the Court misinterpreted why an earlier version of Section
Five was tabled. Specifically, the Court noted that an early Bingham
proposal, which gave broad power to Congress, was tabled and not
again considered, suggesting that Congress had rejected the broader
version on its merits.8 2 In fact, it was postponed, with the support of
Representative Bingham, not tabled. 8 What conclusion can be drawn
from this postponement is a complicated question that can only be
determined through a careful consideration of the full ratification
process. As I will discuss, the decision to postpone was made after the
Senate rejected an early version of the Fourteenth Amendment; that
factor, rather than any opposition in the House, may have affected the
28 Id. at 521.
2 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866).
3o Id. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment passed the House by a vote of 128-
37 on May 10, 1868, with 19 members of Congress not voting. In order to pass by the re-
quired two-thirds margin, the House needed 124 votes in favor of the Amendment. See id.
31 ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND
THE SUPREME COURT 40 (1960).
32 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 521-22.
33 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
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decision to postpone. The Court failed to acknowledge the multiple
meanings that can be attributed to this postponement. I will consider
those multiple meanings in Part III.
Finally, the Court gave inappropriate weight to post-hoc state-
ments about the meaning of Section Five. The Court referred to the
debate over the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871 to support its view that
Congress was granted narrow enforcement powers under Section
Five, extensively quoting remarks offered by Representative Garfield
in 1871 concerning his understanding of the meaning of Section
Five.5 4 But the Court did not explain why we should give weight to
Representative Garfield's post-hoc statements about the meaning of
Section Five. Although Representative Garfield did vote for
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, he was not one of the
original sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not discuss
his views regarding the meaning of Section Five at the time of
ratification.
A more careful examination of the history will show the serious-
ness of these errors.
III. SECTION FIVE
The Court in City of Boerne v. Flores referred to three historical
moments that might be considered relevant to understanding the
meaning of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first his-
torical moment was in late 1865 and early 1866, when the United
States Congress was considering an earlier version of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because Congress was debating a version that was con-
siderably different from that ultimately ratified, we need to be careful
about interpreting this debate. The second important historical mo-
ment was from April to June 1866 when Congress was debating a ver-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment which was similar to the one that
was ultimately ratified. We must be careful in interpreting this debate
not to assume that Congress was discussing the issues that are impor-
tant to us today. The third important historical moment was on April
4, 1871, several years after the Amendment was ratified, when Con-
gress discussed the scope of its Section Five authority in considering
whether to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act pursuant to that authority. We
need to bring the most skepticism to examining this material, because
34 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523-24.
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Congress is discussing text that was ratified by a previous Congress.
Post-hoc material is always of limited utility.
35
A. Early Version: December 1865-April 1866
The first historical moment referred to in Boerne is consideration
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which commenced on December 4,
1865, during the first session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress. Represen-
tative Stevens offered a resolution creating a Joint Committee on Re-
construction. 36 This resolution, which passed the House by a vote of
133 to 36, strictly on party lines, forbid the confederate states from
being admitted to either house pending the Committee's report.
37
Although the President would ordinarily have opened this session
with a state of the Union message, the House pre-empted the Presi-
dent by beginning the session with the resolution on reconstruction.
3 8
This step indicates the importance of the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.
While Congress was creating the Joint Committee, bills were pro-
posed to amend the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment-with
its five parts--was not considered in that form in Congress for many
months. In the opening months of debate, each section was consid-
ered as a separate resolution.
On December 5, 1865, Representative Stevens introduced the
first version of what became Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: "[a]ll national and State laws shall be equally applicable to
every citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race
and color."39 This resolution did not address Congress's power and
therefore is not comparable to Section Five. There was no debate on
the resolution at that time.40
35 Another important historical moment was the ratification process in the states. The
Court makes no mention of that process; hence, I will not discuss it in this article. But a
complete consideration of the Amendment's ratification should consider that important
step of the process.
36 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1865).
37 Id. It is important to remember that the confederate states were not represented in
Congress when it ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. SeeJOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 150 (1956).
38JAMES, supra note 37, at 38-39.
39 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865). According to Professor tenBroek,
Representative Stevens introduced a somewhat modified version of the Fourteenth
Amendment on January 12, 1866 that stated: "[a] 11 laws, state or national, shall operate
impartially and equally on all persons without regard to race and color." JACOBUS TEN-
BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 188 (1951).
40 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865).
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On December 6, 1865, Representative Bingham introduced a
joint resolution "to amend the Constitution of the United States so as
to empower Congress to pass all necessary and proper laws to secure
to all persons in every State of the Union equal protection in their
rights, life, liberty, and property."41 It was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary; no debate occurred at that time.42 Unlike the Stev-
ens' proposal, this proposal would expand the powers of Congress but
would not specifically guarantee rights to all individuals, absent action
by Congress.43 It is the foundation for what became Section Five.
The Senate considered the Joint Resolution to create a Recon-
struction Committee on December 12, 1866.44 The resolution passed,
after being amended to eliminate any specific limitation on the Sen-
ate's right to take independent action pending a committee report.45
The House agreed to the Senate's language on December 13th.46 The
members of the Committee were named in the House and Senate.
47
Although our contemporary focus in considering the Fourteenth
Amendment relates to the meaning of Sections One and Five, the
other sections were very important at the time of ratification. An im-
portant issue was how representation for seats in Congress would be
determined. With the Thirteenth Amendment arguably granting citi-
zenship to African-Americans, and repealing the three-fifths clause, 48
the South's representation in Congress, if it was admitted to the Un-
ion without conditions on determining representation, would in-
4' Id. at 14.
42 Id.
43 Representative Bingham introduced a somewhat modified version of his earlier ver-
sion of the Fourteenth Amendment on January 12, 1866, which contained the following
language: "Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to
all persons in every State within the Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty,
and property." TENBROEK, supra note 39, at 188. This version, like Bingham's earlier ver-
sion gave Congress broad powers through a "necessary and proper" clause.
44 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1865).
45 Id. at 25-40.
4 Id. at 46.
47 The members in the House included Thaddeus Stevens, Elihu B. Washburne (II),
Justin S. Morrill (Vt), Henry Grider (Ky), John A. Bingham (Oh), Rosco Conkling (NY),
George S. Boutwell (Ma), Henry T. Blow (Mo), and AndrewJ. Rogers (NJ). The members
in the Senate included William P. Fessenden (Me), George W. Grimes (Ia),Jacob M. How-
ard (Mi), Reverdy Johnson (Md), George H. Williams (Or), and Ira Harris (NY). JAMES,
supra note 37, at 41, 43-44. Representative Thaddeus Stevens chaired the group in the
House and Senator William P. Fessenden headed the group in the Senate, with Fessenden
serving as the Chairman of theJoint Committee.
48 Under Article I, Section 2, persons who were not "free" were counted as three-fifths
of a person for the purpose of determining representatives to Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2.
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crease dramatically. Section Two, as ultimately ratified, provides that
representation shall include all male inhabitants, except that repre-
sentation shall be reduced proportionally if certain male inhabitants
are denied the right to vote.49 While many radical Republicans would
have preferred to condition readmission to the Union on granting
the franchise to African-Americans, this compromise position none-
theless gave the South an incentive to extend voting rights to African-
Americans in order to increase its proportional representation in
Congress. Section Two was the subject of lengthy debate in the House
and Senate. 50
While the representation amendment was being debated in Con-
gress, the Committee on Reconstruction was also considering an
equal protection provision. The Committee on Reconstruction met
on January 20, 1866, and developed the following language: "Con-
gress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure
to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political
rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protec-
tion in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property."51 This language
reflects the Bingham language, giving broad "necessary and proper"
authority to Congress while also embodying the broad equal protec-
tion principles contained in the Stevens version. It also strengthened
49 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
50 On January 8, 1866, Representative Blaine suggested language for an early version
of Section Two which would have prevented a state from counting any persons who were
not granted civil or political rights for the purpose of determining representation in Con-
gress. Blaine's suggested language stated:
[riepresentation and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several
States which may be included within this Union according to their respective
numbers, which shall be determined by taking the whole number of persons
except those to whom civil or political rights or privileges are denied or
abridged by the constitution or laws of any State on account of race or color.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-42 (1866) (italics omitted). Throughout the de-
bate on the Fourteenth Amendment, the representation amendment received the most
attention and was the subject of frequent revision until the end.
5 TENBROEK, supra note 39, at 188; see alsoJAMES, supra note 37, at 53 (discussing this
language.) The Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction offered the fol-
lowing, slightly different version of the Fourteenth Amendment on January 27, 1866:
"Congress shall have the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to
secure all persons in every State full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and prop-
erty; and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same immunities and also
equal political rights and privileges." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866). This lan-
guage continued to use the broad "necessary and proper" language proposed by Repre-
sentative Bingham and there continued to be no discussion about the merits of this lan-
guage in the Congressional Globe.
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the Stevens version through reference to "political rights," which was
intended "to open the way for Negro voting on a national scale."52
Representative Bingham introduced another version of the Four-
teenth Amendment on February 3, 1866 which read:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each
State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states.. .and to all persons in the several States equal protec-
tion in the rights of life, liberty, and property ... 13
Its language is quite similar to the language proposed by the Commit-
tee on Reconstruction, but did not contain the "political rights"
clause; instead it retained the strong "necessary and proper" clause.
Representative Bingham presumably deleted the reference to political
rights so that the Fourteenth Amendment would not be interpreted as
requiring states to grant suffrage to newly freed slaves. Although the
Republicans preferred such a requirement, they recognized that it
was not politically feasible. Hence, the representation debate over
what became Section Two was also influencing the content of the
equality provision under what became Section One.
The House began debate on the Bingham language on February
27, 1866.54 Representatives disagreed about whether the proposed
Amendment created new powers for Congress or simply reinforced
existing Congressional power under the "necessary and proper"
clause.
55
On February 28, 1866, debate focused on whether Section Five
granted too much power to Congress. 56 This was the only time in the
entire debate over the Fourteenth Amendment when this issue was
central to the discussion. Representative Davis argued that he would
not consent to "centralization of power in Congress in derogation of
constitutional limitations, nor [would he] lodge there to-day [sic] any
grant of power which may in other times, and under the control of
52 JAMES, supra note 37, at 81.
53 Id. at 82.
5 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1054 (1866). Representative Higby opened the
debate by saying that the proposed language "will only have the effect to give vitality and
life to portions of the Constitution that probably were intended from the beginning to
have life and vitality, but which have received such a construction that they have been en-
tirely ignored and have become as dead matter in that instrument." Id.
5 5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1057 (1866).
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1087-88 (1866).
2002]
Boston College Law Review
unprincipled political aspirants or demagogues, be exercised in con-
travention of the rights and liberties of [his] countrymen."
57
Representative Woodbridge responded to these federalism con-
cerns by saying: "[t]he adoption of this amendment, Mr. Speaker, will
be no shock upon the present well-arranged system, defining the
powers of the General Government and the States, under which we
have so happily lived." 58 Similarly, Representative Bingham reassured
the federalists:
[t]he proposition pending before the House is simply a
proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the
consent of the power of the United States, with the power to
enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution to-
day. It "hath that extent-no more."59
Objections to this draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, however,
did not come only from federalists. Radical Republicans objected to
the language because it did not go far enough in creating substantive
rights of equality.60
In one of the most confusing historical moments concerning the
Fourteenth Amendment, the resolution was then postponed in the
House by a vote of 110 to 37, with the key supporters of the resolu-
tion-Representatives Bingham and Stevens-voting in favor of post-
ponement.61 Was this postponement a response to the federalism ob-
jection, to the Radical Republican objections, or to some other
57 Id. at 1087.
5 Id. at 1088.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 1095. Representative Hotchkiss spoke in opposition to the proposed lan-
guage because, in his opinion, the proposed amendment did not go far enough in giving
individuals a guaranteed right of equality. The proposed language, he argued, left the
enforcement of equality "to the caprice of Congress." See id. He then said:
His amendment is not as strong as the Constitution now is. The Constitution
now gives equal rights to a certain extent to all citizens. This amendment pro-
vides that Congress may pass laws to enforce these rights. Why not provide by
an amendment to the Constitution that no State shall discriminate against
any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as a part of the organic
law of the land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional
amendment .... Let us have a little time to compare our views upon this sub-
ject, and agree upon an amendment that shall secure beyond question what
the gentleman desires to secure. It is with that view, and no other, that I shall
vote to postpone this subject for the present.
61 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866).
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reason? The Boerne Court concluded that postponement was neces-
sary in response to the federalism objections.
A close examination of the historical record suggests that it is
very unlikely that the federalists should receive credit for the post-
ponement in the House. At the time of postponement, the Four-
teenth Amendment was also stalled in the Senate because of dis-
agreement about the proper language for what became Section
Two. 62 Objections were being offered by radical Republicans who
were concerned that the proposed representation language did not
sufficiently penalize the South for its role in the War.63 The proposed
language for Section Two could not pass the Senate on March 9, 1866
by the required two-thirds majority.64 After it received a 25 to 22 vote
of support, and various substitute propositions were submitted in an
air of confusion, Senator Fessenden supported a postponement mo-
tion.65
Professor James cites the uncertainty of ratification of Section
Two in the Senate as an important factor influencing postponement
in the House.66 Section Two was re-written extensively before a version
was deemed acceptable by radical Senate Republicans. The language
of Section Five, by contrast, received very little modification during
the ratification process and there is no evidence that Democrats or
moderate Republicans insisted on language changes in Section Five in
exchange for ratification. Like the radical Republicans, they were far
more concerned about the rules regarding representation in Con-
gress. By examining Section Five out of the context of Section Two,
the Boerne Court misunderstood the factors leading to postponement
in the House and gave too much weight to a few comments made on
one day of a lengthy ratification process.
B. April20, 1866-May 10, 1866
After the defeat of the representation amendment in the Senate,
the Committee on Reconstruction was in search of a successful com-
promise proposal. The second important historical moment referred
6 2 Id. at 1288-89.
63 See id.
6 Id. at 1289.
65Id.
6 SeeJAMEs, supra note 37, at 87 ("Opposition within the Republican majority seemed
to center about those who opposed the resolution on principle and those who thought it
impractical to pass on more amendments before the representation resolution had been
decided upon in the Senate.").
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to by the Boerne Court in its Section Five analysis began when an Indi-
ana reformer named Robert Dale Owen came forth in April 1866 with
a five-part proposal that paralleled the language ultimately ratified by
Congress. 67 This proposal did not grant immediate suffrage to Afri-
can-Americans, which disappointed Stevens, but he agreed to support
the proposal before the Joint Committee because it appeared that it
could be ratified.68 Owen's plan was approved by the Committee on
Reconstruction on April 21, with some modifications. 69 Owen's lan-
guage changed the "necessary and proper" clause contained in prior
versions to a "legitimate" clause.
In subsequent committee debate, significant changes were made
to the Owen proposal which Professor James categorizes as making
"Owen's proposal ... almost unrecognizable." 70 Admittedly, the ver-
sion adopted by the Committee on April 29, 1866 was considerably
stronger than Owen's proposal. 71 The important point, however, is
67 The proposal included the following language:
Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any State, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
Section 2. From and after the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and
seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made in any state nor by the United
States, as to the enjoyment, by classes of persons, of the right of suffrage, be-
cause of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 3. Until the fourth day of July, eighteen hundred and seventy-six,
no class of persons, as the right of any of whom to suffrage, discrimination
shall be made by any State, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.
Section 4. Debts incurred in aid of insurrection, or of war against the Un-
ion, and claims of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall
not be paid by any State nor by the United States.
Section 5. Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article.
Id. at 100.
68 Id. at 101.
69 Id. at 107.
70 Id. at 114.
71 The Committee's April 29th version stated:
Section 1. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union according to their respective num-
bers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But whenever in any State the elective franchise shall be denied to
any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any
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that the Committee never modified the Section Five language pro-
posed by Owen. It is not clear that anyone even paid any attention to
Owen's modification of the Section Five language, because the reason
for it to be modified from "necessary and proper" to "appropriate"
was never explained by any member of Congress. By ignoring Owen's
role in drafting the new language, the Boerne Court assumed that this
language change was proposed by the Amendment's key proponents.
Representative Stevens introduced this version of the Fourteenth
Amendment on April 30, 1866, and no debate occurred at that time.
72
Senator Fessenden performed a similar function in the Senate.
73
He discussed the proposed Fourteenth Amendment in the Senate on
May 2, 1866.74 The measure was not specifically debated at that time
but he generally explained that it was a compromise measure "which
seemed to be the best scheme with regard to reconstruction upon
which they could come to a unanimous or nearly unanimous agree-
ment."7"
The Fourteenth Amendment was next considered in Congress on
May 8, 1866.76 Representative Stevens opened the debate, in part, with
these words:
[t]his proposition is not all that the committee desired. It
falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe
that it is all that can be obtained in the present state of pub-
lic opinion. Not only Congress but the several States are to
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of
representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of male citizens shall bear to the whole number of such male citizens
not less than twenty-one years of age.
Section 3. Until the 4th day of July, in the year 1870, all persons who vol-
untarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it aid and comfort, shall be
excluded from the right to vote for Representatives in Congress and for elec-
tors for President and Vice-President of the United States.
Section 4. Neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any
debt or obligation already incurred, or which may hereafter be incurred, in
aid of insurrection or of war against the United States, or any claim for com-
pensation for the loss of involuntary service or labor.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legis-
lation the provisions of this article.
JAMES, supra note 37, at 115-16.
72 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866).
73JAMES, supra note 37, at 120.
74 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2332-33 (1866).
75 Id.
76 Id. at 2459.
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be consulted. Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we
did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be in-
duced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this. 77
Because Representative Stevens was one of two key leaders who
supported the Fourteenth Amendment in the House of Representa-
tive, historians have given considerable weight to his views. The Boerne
Court assumed that the finally-ratified version of Section Five with-
drew important enforcement powers from Congress and thereby "fell
short of his wishes."78 In the context of the contemporary debate
about the scope of Congress's power to enact legislation to remedy
potential (but not actual) violations of the Constitution, it is therefore
argued that Stevens' comments are evidence that those who proposed
limited powers for Congress prevailed when Section Five was ratified.
But as Professor tenBroek has argued, "[t]he mere fact that the so-
called negative form emerged after the federalism objection does not
necessarily mean that the federalism objection was the cause of the
change or that the new language was intended to obviate the objec-
tion. " 79
An examination of Stevens' statement, in context, makes it
doubtful that he had Section Five in mind when he made this state-
ment that the Amendment fell short of his "wishes." Stevens discussed
Sections One, Two and Three extensively, made a brief statement
about Section Four and did not mention Section Five.80 It does not
appear that he even considered Section Five to be of much impor-
tance. He described Section Two as "the most important in the arti-
cle."
8 '
In his description of Section One, Stevens described no disap-
pointment. He spoke of the importance of these rights being
specified in the Constitution so that "[t]his amendment once adopted
cannot be annulled without two thirds of Congress."82 He indirectly
alluded to Section Five when he said: "[t]he Constitution limits only
the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This
amendment supplies that defect, and allows Congress to correct the
77 Id.
78 Id. The Boerne Court stated that: 1[t]he revised Amendment proposal did not raise
the concerns expressed earlier regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform
national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523.
79 TENBROEK, supra note 39, at 203.
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unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates
upon one man shall operate equally upon all."83 The scope of Con-
gress's power, however, seemed to be of less concern to Stevens than
the scope of Section One's constitutional authority, because he pre-
sumed that constitutional challenges under Section One would be
more likely than congressional action under Section Five. In particu-
lar, he was doubtful of the ability of the liberals to retain control of
Congress to enact enforcement legislation under Section Five. Thus,
speaking of legislative civil rights, he said, "[a]nd I need hardly say
that the first time that the South with their copperhead allies obtain
the command of Congress it will be repealed. The veto of the Presi-
dent and their votes on the bill are conclusive evidence of that."84 The
important point, for him, was that an amendment can only be re-
pealed by a two-thirds vote. Thus, he wanted protection from a future,
more conservative Congress and did not envision a liberal Congress
that might enact legislation to enforce civil rights.
Representative Stevens also made it clear that he was disap-
pointed with the weakening of Section Two that occurred during the
drafting process.8 5 In the version considered by Congress on May 8th,
a state lost its right to representation in Congress in proportion to its
denial of suffrage to adult male citizens.8 6 Stevens would have pre-
ferred that a state entirely forfeit its representation in Congress if it
failed to provide full enfranchisement.8 7 When Stevens earlier said
that the states would object to a stronger version of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it appears that he had Section Two in mind. Professor
James has explained that Stevens was "mortifi [ed] at the defeat of the
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). Stevens says,
I admit that this article is not as good as the one we sent to death in the Sen-
ate. In my judgment, we shall not approach the measure of justice until we
have given every adult freedman a homestead on the land where he was born
and toiled and suffered.
Id
8Id.
87 Id. at 2460. Stevens therefore stated:
This section allows the States to discriminate among the same class, and re-
ceive proportionate credit in representation. This I dislike. But it is a short
step forward. The large stride which we in vain proposed is dead; the mur-
derers must answer to the suffering race. I would not have been the perpetra-
tor. A load of misery must sit heavy on their souls.
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committee's first proposition on representation."8 8 He must have be-
lieved "that the amendment just reported was all that could pass the
two houses. " 89
Representative Stevens also criticized Section Three as being too
lenient.90 This section prohibited rebels from voting for members of
Congress and electors of the President until 1870.91 Stevens argued
that, at the least, the prohibition should be "extended to 1876, and
[should] include all State and municipal as well as national elec-
tions."92 Despite his objections to Section Three, he said, "I will move
no amendment, nor vote for any, lest the whole fabric should tumble
to pieces."93 Stevens then mentioned Section Four, made no mention
of Section Five, and moved to recommit the joint resolution to the
Committee on Reconstruction.
94
In the debate that followed, there was little discussion that re-
lated to Section Five. The bulk of the discussion instead involved Sec-
tions Two and Three.95 Representative Thayer, who ultimately voted
for ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, objected to Sections
Two and Three, because they served to divide the country and disen-
franchise some citizens.96 Similarly, Representative Boyer, who op-
posed ratification, objected to Section Three because it denied "alto-
gether the right of the Federal Government to disenfranchise the
majority of the citizens of any State on account of their past participa-
tion in the rebellion."97 When he mentioned Section Five, he simply
said, "[u]pon this latter [Section Five] it will not be necessary to re-
mark."98 If Section Five were controversial, one would have expected
more discussion of it.
88JAMES, supra note 37, at 125.
89 Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866).





95 As Professor tenBroek has noted: "[like the February debates, those of May and
June were preoccupied mainly with the patently political sections of the amendment, sec-
tions 2 and 3." TENBROEK, supra note 39, at 208.
9 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2465 (1866). Representative Thayer said,
"[w] hat will continue to be the condition of the country if you adopt this feature of the
proposed plan? Continual distraction, continued agitation, continued bickerings, contin-
ued opposition to the law, and it will be well for the country if a new insurrection shall not
spring from its bosom." Id.
97 Id. at 2467.
98 Id.
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In response to these comments, Representative Kelley, who voted
for ratification, supported the importance of Sections Two and Three,
because he thought it important not to permit the rebels to govern
the country.99 Representative Kelley did express some disappointment
that Section Five was not stronger, because he wanted it to go further
and "at once enfranchise every loyal man in the country."100 He ap-
parently did not want to leave that step to the states or Congress; he
wanted it addressed directly in the Fourteenth Amendment. He may
have viewed Section Five as giving Congress the power to enfranchise
African-American men but, like Representative Garfield, may have
been concerned that a conservative Congress would not take that
step. Ultimately, the right to vote was guaranteed through the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. 101
Representative Schenck, who eventually voted for ratification,
responded to criticisms of Section Three.10 2 Representative Smith,
who opposed ratification, then spoke in opposition to Section Three,
arguing that it is improper to disenfranchise citizens.
103
Discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment resumed on May 9,
1866.104 Representative Broomall spoke in favor of the Amendment
although he stated, "[i]t is not what I wanted. How far short of it!"105
He defended the importance of Sections Two and Three but did not
discuss Section Five at all. Representative Shanklin spoke next and
argued that Sections Two and Three act to keep the South out of the
union.1°6 When Representative Raymond spoke about the Fourteenth
Id. at 2468. Representative Kelley said:
Who ought to govern this country? The men who for more than four years
sustained bloody war for its overthrow, or they whom my colleague designates
as "that proscriptive body of men known as the great Union party" who main-
tained the Government against the most gigantic rebellion since that which
Satan led?
Id at 2465.
10 0 Id. at 2469.
101 Section One of the Fifteenth Amendment, which was ratified in 1870, states: "The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
102 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2469-71 (1866).
103 See id. at 2472.
104 Id. at 2498.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 2501. He said, for example: "[d) ischarge your joint committee on recon-
struction; abolish your Freedmen's Bureau; repeal your civil rights bill, and admit all the
delegates from the seceded States to their seats in Congress, who have been elected ac-
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Amendment, he described the five parts of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as constituting "five in form, but only four in substance." 0 7 He
then went on to discuss the first four parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment, entirely ignoring Section Five. 108 Raymond made no
mention of the fact that the Bingham version of Section Five was
stronger than the version before Congress on May 9, 1866. He was
simply trying to show that the Republicans were inconsistent in saying
that Congress already had the power which they now were seeking to
add to Congress's list of powers.
Representative Wilson later asked Representative Raymond to
explain why he was opposed to Congress having those powers, even if
he thought that Congress did not previously have those powers.
°9
Representative Raymond responded by saying that he did intend to
vote to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment: "I shall vote for that
amendment cheerfully, because I think Congress should have that
cording to the laws of the country and possess the constitutional qualification, and all will
be well." Id.
107 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2502 (1866).
108 See id. Nonetheless, his comments indirectly reference Section Five. His comments
include a recitation of the events that occurred before the current version of Section Five
was proposed:
And now, sir, with regard to these amendments, five in form, but only four in
substance, I have this to say: that, with one exception, they are such as com-
mend themselves to my approval. The principle of the first, which secures an
equality of rights among all the citizens of the United States, has had a some-
what curious history. It was first embodied in a proposition introduced by the
distinguished gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. Bingham,] in the form of an
amendment to the Constitution, giving Congress power to secure an absolute
equality of civil rights in every State of the Union. It was discussed somewhat
in that form, but, encountering considerable opposition from both sides of
the House, it was finally postponed, and is still pending. Next it came before
us in the form of a bill, by which Congress proposed to exercise precisely the
powers which that amendment was intended to confer, and to provide for en-
forcing against State tribunals the prohibitions against unequal legislation. I
regarded it as very doubtful, to say the least, whether Congress, under the ex-
isting Constitution, had any power to enact such a law; and I thought, and still
think, that very many members who voted for the bill also doubted the power
of Congress to pass it, because they voted for the amendment by which that
power was to be conferred. At all events, acting for myself and upon my own
conviction on this subject, I did not vote for the bill when it was first passed,
and when it came back to use from the President with his objections I voted
against it. And now, although that bill became a law and is now upon our
statute-book, it is again proposed so to amend the Constitution as to confer
upon Congress the power to pass it.
109 Id. at 2512.
[Vol. 43:783
The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of Boerne
power."110 In fact, the record reflects that Raymond did vote in favor
of ratification."'
Representative Miller spoke in support of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 He mentioned each of the five sections
and then explained why he supported them. As to Section Five, he
said:
[t]he fifth section gives to Congress the power to enforce the
provisions of this article by appropriate legislation. This of
course is requisite to enforce the foregoing sections, or such
of them as may be adopted, and is too plain to admit of ar-
gument; and in fact is not, as I am aware, contested by any
gentleman in this House.113
His comment about Section Five being uncontroversial is consistent
with the recorded debate.
When Representative Eliot spoke in favor of ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, he echoed earlier comments about it not
going as far as one might wish:
[t]his amendment is not, as I believe, all that ought to be of-
fered by that committee and passed by this House and made
by the loyal Legislatures of the United States a part of our
organic law; but it is right as far as it goes, and upon careful
examination I find contained in it no compromise of princi-
ple. That being settled I am willing to defer to the opinions
of other gentlemen, and be content with the best that can be
obtained." 4
His explanatory comments, however, reflected no disappointment
with Section Five. He explained:
I voted for the civil rights bill, and I did so under a convic-
tion that we have ample power to enact into law the provi-
sions of that bill. But I shall gladly do what I may to incorpo-
rate into the Constitution provisions which will settle the
110 Id. at 2513.
111 Id. at 2545.
112 SeeCONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2510-11 (1866).
113 Id.
1
4 Id. at 2511.
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doubt which some gentlemen entertain upon that ques-
tion.11
5
His reservations related to the compromises reached under Sections
Two and Three, not Five.
Debate in the House resumed on May 10, 1866.116 Representative
Randall opened the debate."17 He defended the first four sections and
did not mention Section Five at all. Representative Strouse spoke
next.118 His comments were confined to political issues concerning
the effects of Sections Two and Three; he did not speak to Section
Five.n 9
The next speaker was Representative Banks.1 20 His comments
concerned what he perceived to be the disenfranchisement of the
southern states under the Fourteenth Amendment if they decline to
accept the terms of the amendment.121 In response, Representative
Eckley defended Sections Two and Three, saying:
It] he only objection I have to the proposition is that it does
not go far enough. I would disenfranchise them forever.
They have no right, founded in justice, to participate in the
administration of the Government or exercise political
power. If they receive protection in their persons and prop-
erty, are permitted to share in the nation's bounties, and live
in security under the broad aegis of the nation's flag, it is far
more than the nation owes them.122
Representative Beaman then reiterated his opposition to Section
Three, because it did not go far enough: "[i]t seems to me that the
third section will be found useless in its results and impracticable in
its operation, while it is calculated to foster irritation and bad blood
among the people of the South." 123 The Amendment would have be
inoperative because electors for President and Vice President can be
appointed by the legislatures. It was insufficient because it did not ex-
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2530.
117 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2530-31 (1866).
118 Id. at 2531.
119 Id. at 2531-32.
120 Id. at 2532.
121 Id. at 2532-34.
12 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2535-36 (1866).
123 Id. at 2537.
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tend to the election of Senators. He therefore urged the rules to
permit amendment to Section Three before the final vote. 124
The discussion continued with respect to the political conse-
quences of ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. Representative
Farnsworth then spoke in favor of ratification. 12 5 As with earlier
speakers, he discussed each of the first four sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment but did not mention Section Five. Shortly before the
vote on this version of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative
Bingham spoke in support.126 He, too, said nothing about Section
Five. Representative Stevens closed the debate by reiterating his dis-
appointment with Section Three:
Gentlemen tell us it is too strong-too strong for what? Too
strong for their stomachs, but not for the people. Some say it
is too lenient. It is too lenient for my hard heart. Not only to
1870, but to every rebel who shed the blood of loyal men
should be prevented from exercising any power in this Gov-
ernment. That, even, would be too mild a punishment for
them.12
7
Under the rules of the House, an amendment could not be of-
fered to the proposed language if the version under consideration was
seconded. It was seconded and Representative Garfield was not able
to introduce an amendment which would have permanently barred
rebels from holding any political office. 128 The vote was then taken on
the joint resolution. It passed by a vote of 128 to 37, with 19 members
not voting, meeting the required two-thirds margin.12 9 The vote was
strictly along party lines, with Representative Raymond, who had criti-
cized the amendment, voting in favor of it.130
In sum, we can find evidence that Stevens was disappointed with
the language ratified in Sections One, Two or Three of the Constitu-
tion but no evidence that he was disappointed with the language
ratified in Section Five. The language changes that were made during
the ratification process seemed necessary to secure the ratification of
the. states, not the ratification of Congress. There is no evidence that
124 Id.
125 See id. at 2539-41.
12 See id. at 2541-43.
127 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2544 (1866).
128 Id. at 2545.
12 Id.
1s0 See id. at 2545; see alSOJAMES, supra note 37, at 131.
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any language change to Section Five altered the vote of a single con-
servative member of Congress. But the states were concerned about
losing their representatives to Congress and about certain citizens be-
ing disenfranchised. The language of Sections Two and Three were
modified to alleviate those concerns. The members of the House who
objected to the broader version of Section Five continued to oppose
ratification even after that language was changed. So, there is no evi-
dence that any additional votes were secured in reliance on that
change in language.
Senator Fessenden initially announced that debate in the Senate
on the amendment which had been ratified by the House would be-
gin on May 21, 1866.131 In fact, sickness prevented Fessenden from
exercising his duties and Senator Howard took over the role of intro-
ducing and defending the proposed amendment.13 2 Consideration of
the amendment began in the Senate on May 23, 1866.133 In his open-
ing statement about the proposed amendment, he made little refer-
ence to Section Five. His sole statement on that subject in his opening
remark was: "[t]he power which Congress has, under this amend-
ment, is derived, not from [Section One], but from the fifth section,
which gives it authority to pass laws which are appropriate to the at-
tainment of the great object of the amendment."13 4 He acknowledged
that Section Two did not entirely satisfy him, because he would have
preferred direct African-American suffrage but he supported the
'SIJAMES, supra note 37, at 134.
132 Id. at 135. Senator Howard explained: "Mr. President, I regret that the state of the
health of the honorable Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden] who is chairman, on the
part of the Senate of the joint committee of fifteen, is such as to disable him from opening
the discussion of this grave and important measure." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2764-65 (1866).
133 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2763 (1866). Senator Fessenden did participate
in debate on that day so it is unclear whether it was illness that caused him not to fulfill his
duties as Committee Chair.
134 Id. at 2766. In a later passage he reiterated that point with the following statement:
[Section five] gives to Congress power to enforce by appropriate legislation
all the provisions of this article of amendment. Without this clause, no power
is granted to Congress by the amendment or any one of its sections. It casts
upon Congress the responsibility of seeing to it, for the future, that all the
sections of the amendment are carried out in good faith, and that no State in-
fringes the rights of persons or property. I look upon this clause as indispen-
sable for the reason that it imposes upon Congress this power and this duty. It
enables Congress, in case die States shall enact laws in conflict with the prin-
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amendment as an appropriate compromise. 135 He also expressed his
reservations with Section Three as failing to provide for the dis-
qualification of rebels for both federal and state office. 136 In the de-
bate that followed his remarks, no reference was made to Section Five.
The discussion focused instead on the payment of rebel debt.137
Whatever dissatisfaction existed with the proposed language of
the Fourteenth Amendment was not extensively discussed in a public
session. The Senate soon went into an executive session138 and the
Republican caucus met to discuss language modifications. Four
changes were proposed from the caucus on May 30, 1866: (1) the in-
sertion of the definition of "citizen" in Section One; (2) a few textual
changes to Section Two; (3) an entirely new Section Three; and (4) a
substitute for Section Four.3 9 The House language with respect to
Section Five went unchanged. In the debate which followed in the
Senate, Section Five received no discussion, although there was still
criticism of the rules regarding representation and the lack of protec-
tion for African-American suffrage. 40 Some minor changes occurred
during the debate in the Senate; but none of these changes affected
Section Five. 141 A vote was taken in the Senate on June 8, 1866.142 The
vote was 33 to 11, with 5 Senators not casting ballots. 143
The debate in the Senate is not very illuminating, because most
of the decisionmaking occurred in the Republican caucus. The vote
was taken before the printed report of the Joint Committee was avail-
able, leading some historians to complain that there was "so much
haste after so much delay."' 44 All we really know is that Senator Sum-
ner, and his radical colleagues, who had opposed the ratification of an
earlier version based on nearly identical principles, voted in favor of
this final version. 145
On June 13, Representative Stevens reported to the House that
the Joint Committee had examined the Senate amendments to the
resolution passed by the House and unanimously recommended that
135 See id. at 2766-67.
136 Id. at 2768.
137 See id. at 2768-69.
138 CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 2771 (1866).
139 SeeJAMES, supra note 37, at 142.
140 See id. at 148.
141 See id. (describing the changes).
142 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3042 (1866).
143 Id.
144JAMES, supra note 37, at 150.
145 See id. at 149-50.
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the changes should be accepted.146 After little discussion, the vote was
120 to 32.147
In sum, the debate in the House and Senate focused on Sections
Two, Three and Four, not Sections One or Five. Although some fed-
eralism objections were made in the early days of the debate, these
objections were largely discontinued as focus was placed on the rules
regarding representation in Congress and on whether the newly freed
slaves should be entitled to vote. Because of concern that southern
Democrats would come to control Congress in the near future, there
was little concern about Congress overstepping its power under Sec-
tion Five. Today's issues-the meaning of the phrase "equal protec-
tion" and the scope of Congress's authority-were simply not the
main issues of the day in 1866. In particular, there is no evidence
whatsoever that the language change from "necessary and proper" to
"appropriate" was a deliberate attempt to gain more votes in favor of
the Amendment. This language change was never discussed, in con-
trast to the language changes to Section Two, Three, and Four which
received extensive discussion. Too much historical weight has been
given to what was viewed at the time as an inconsequential language
change.
C. Ku Klux Klan Act Adoption: 1871
The 1871 debate over the adoption of the Ku Klux Klan Act can
also provide us with some insight about the intended meaning of Sec-
tion Five. Representatives Bingham and Garfield engaged in a lengthy
colloquy which is reprinted in the Appendix to the Congressional
Globe in 1871. The issue is whether Congress has the enforcement
authority to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act (H.R. No. 320). Representa-
tive Garfield argued that Section Five did not grant Congress
sufficient authority to enact the Act.
There are two important points to consider to understand
Garfield's testimony. First, one must understand the extremely broad
scope of the Ku Klux Klan Act that was under consideration. Section
Two of the bill as introduced by Representative Shellabarger, made it
a crime to conspire to violate the "rights, privileges or immunities" to
which a citizen is entitled under the "Constitution and laws," by acts,
which if committed in an area under the jurisdiction of the United
States, would constitute "murder, manslaughter, mayhem, robbery,
146 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3144 (1866).
147 Id. at 3149.
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assault and battery, perjury, subornation of perjury, criminal obstruc-
tion of legal process, or resistance of officers .... arson, or larceny
.... 148 Representative Shellabarger later introduced an amendment
to limit the scope of the section to situations in which there is a depri-
vation of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or im-
munities under the laws." 149 This language was ultimately adopted by
Congress and signed into law by President Grant.
Scholars have disputed whether Representative Shellabarger in-
troduced this amendment in response to Representative Garfield's
criticisms that the Ku Klux Klan Act was drafted too broadly to be
within Congress's authority. One student note argued that this
amendment was drafted to limit the scope of the Ku Klux Klan Act. 150
Professor Steven Shatz disputes this interpretation of the amendment.
He argues that "[i] t is unclear whether the amendment was substi-
tuted simply to clarify the intent of the section as originally drafted or,
on the other hand, to limit the scope of the section."151
148 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 317 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
The second section of the bill:
provides that if two or more persons shall, within the limits of any State, band,
conspire, or combine together to do any act in violation of the rights, privi-
leges, or immunities of any person, to which he is entitled under the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States, which, committed within a place under
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, would, under any law
of the United States then in force, constitute the crime of either murder,
manslaughter, mayhem, robbery, assault and battery, perjury, subornation of
perjury, criminal obstruction of legal, process or resistance of officers in dis-
charge of official duty, arson, or larceny, and if one or more of the parties to
said conspiracy or combination shall do any act to effect the object thereof,
all the parties to or engaged in said conspiracy or combination, whether prin-
cipals or accessories, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be liable to a penalty of not exceeding $10,000, or to imprison-
ment not exceeding ten years, or both, at the discretion of the court; pro-
vided, that if any party or parties to such conspiracy or combination shall, in
furtherance of such common design, commit the crime of murder, such party
or parties so guilty shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer death; and provided
also, that any offense punishable under this act, begun in one judicial district
of the United States and completed in another, may be dealt with, inquired
of, tried, determined, and punished in either district.
Id. at 317.149 Id. at 477 (language that Rep. Shellabarger introduced).
150 See Mark Fockele, Comment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original
Purpose, 46 U. CHI. L. Rv. 402, 412 (1979).
151 Steven E Shatz, The Second Death of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3): The Use and Misuse of
History in Statutory Interpretation, 27 B.C. L. Rzv. 911,914 n.17 (1986).
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We do not need to resolve the issue of Representative Shellabar-
ger's intent to assess what this particular bill tells us about Congress's
understanding of the scope of Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Of course, the debates of 1871 cannot tell us anything
definitely about the intention of the Congress of 1868 when it ratified
Section Five because it is not the same Congress. Moreover, the de-
bate in 1871 concerns the interpretation of already-ratified language
rather than the more basic question of whether Section Five should
be ratified at all. Nonetheless, to the extent that the 1871 debate is
helpful to our understanding of the intentions of the 1868 Congress,
one must note an important aspect of the 1871 debate-the Ku Klux
Klan Act was passed by Congress. In other words, Representative
Garfield's argument that the bill gave too much power to Congress
was ultimately not accepted by a majority of Congress. 152
Another way to understand the historical record concerning the
passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act is to say that it provides us with in-
sight as to what a contemporary Congress thought was the scope of its
authority. The best evidence of that authority would be the language
of the Ku Klux Klan Act itself. Did it comport with a broad or narrow
understanding of Congress's power?
A strong argument can be made that the Ku Klux Klan Act, as
enacted, did reflect a broad understanding of Congress's power, be-
cause it made conduct unlawful irrespective of the existence of state
action. In 1883, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Ku
Klux Klan Act as making it unlawful for twenty men to take four pris-
oners from jail and beat them, despite the fact that state action was
not alleged in the action. 153 It held that the Ku Klux Klan Act could
not constitutionally reach such conduct, but did not dispute that the
language of the Act was intended to reach such conduct.
Interestingly, the interpretation of the Ku Klux Klan Act ren-
dered by the Supreme Court in 1883 was similar to the broad view of
Section Five presented by Representative Bingham on the state action
requirement-that Congress could pass legislation pursuant to Sec-
tion Five which regulated private conduct without evidence of state
action. The Court said:
[The Ku Klux Klan Act] is not limited to take effect only in
case the State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, or deprive any person of life,
152 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 522 (1871).
153 SeeUnited States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883).
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liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to
any person the equal protection of the laws. It applied, no
matter how well the State may have performed its duty. Un-
der it private persons are liable to punishment for conspir-
ing to deprive any one of the equal protection of the laws
enacted by the State.154
Democrats and conservative Republicans had opposed the origi-
nal version of Section Five drafted by Representative Bingham be-
cause they argued it upset the correct balance between Congress and
the states. Yet, the Congress which ratified the Fourteenth Amend-
ment also passed a statute under its Section Five enforcement author-
ity which was understood to upset that balance by creating, in essence,
a federal criminal and civil conspiracy statute which regulated purely
private activity without a state action requirement. One therefore
must wonder whether Representative Bingham's view on the state ac-
tion requirement did, in fact, prevail when Section Five was ratified. 55
There are two important lessons to be learned from these deci-
sions involving the Ku Klux Klan Act. First, this dispute should remind
us that the primary issue in the ratification debate about the scope of
Congress's authority had to do with the state action requirement, not
the issue of whether Congress could use a broader lens than the
courts in determining what is an equal protection violation. The latter
dispute is a contemporary one. The former dispute is the one that
animated the Thirty-Ninth Congress. When we interpret the
ratification debates' references to broad and narrow interpretations
of Congressional authority, we should not assume that those debates
are referring to our present debate about the scope of Congress's
power.
Although it is not the purpose of this Article to re-examine the
decisions with respect to the state action requirement, it seems quite
154 d. at 639.
155 It was not until 1951 that the Court began to import a state action requirement into
the Ku Klux Klan Act as a matter of statutory interpretation. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951). The Court interpreted the phrase "equal protection of law" to contain an
implicit state action requirement. It stated:
[I]t is clear that this statute does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to deprive
one of rights, unless it is a deprivation of equality, of "equal protection of
law," or of "equal privileges and immunities under the law"... . [P]rivate dis-
crimination is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation
of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so.
Id. at 661.
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possible that the Supreme Court has interpreted Section Five too nar-
rowly in that respect.1 56 The ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
arguably did intend to give Congress the authority to enact legislation
like the Violence Against Women Act,157 to protect African-American's
civil rights, and even against violations by private actors.1 58
But what can this debate tell us about our current controversy-
the scope of Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity?
By analogy, I would be willing to argue that the ratifiers did envision a
broad rather than narrow role for Congress under Section Five. It
wanted Congress to be able to go further than merely barring con-
duct that would be unconstitutional under Section One, since the Ku
Klux Klan Act banned private conduct that would not be unconstitu-
tional under Section One. As a philosophical matter, it saw a role for
Congress's power under Section Five to be broader than a court's
power under Section One to find that conduct was unconstitutional.
156 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (emphasizing the "time-
honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action" and holding that VAWA cannot be justified under Section Five because of in-
sufficient evidence of state action underlying the statutory scheme).
157 1 say "like" the Violence Against Women Act, because, of course, the ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not contemplate that amendment applying to issues of gen-
der equality, especially since the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly only extended suffrage to
additional men. This observation again raises the question of why it makes sense for history
to influence the meaning of Section Five when it does not influence the meaning of Sec-
tion One's Equal Protection Clause.
158 The Morrison Court does briefly examine the history of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to justify its narrow interpretation of the state action requirement. It cites some cases
from the Nineteenth Century, in which the Court had concluded that Congress exceeded
its authority in regulating private conduct under Section Five and says:
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions stems not
only from the length of time they have been on the books, but also from the
insight attributable to the Members of the Court at that time. Every Member
had been appointed by President Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Ar-
thur-and each of their judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge
and familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Morison, 529 U.S. at 622.
Although the Court's statement about the composition of the Court is factually
correct, I would assert that it is even more relevant that the Congress which had recently
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment thought it had granted itself the power to enact legis-
lation under Section Five which banned purely private conduct. If we are to consider the
understanding of the text, at the time that it was ratified by the "intelligent and informed
people of the time" then I would argue that the views of the ratifying Congress should take
precedence over the views of a later Supreme Court that was not. part of the ratification
process.
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The ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment supported a broader
role for Congress than is reflected in the Supreme Court's most re-
cent Section Five jurisprudence. The current standard puts a very
high burden of proof on Congress if it wants to go beyond the terms
of what the Court has explicitly said is unconstitutional under Section
One. It imposes a high documentation requirement on Congress that
has, so far, proven to be illusive. 59 Clearly, the ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment did want to expand Congress's enforcement
authority while also giving individuals the right to seek direct en-
forcement in the courts. The ratifiers were concerned that Congress
would again be dominated by conservative Democrats and wanted to
make sure that the judiciary could be a source for the enforcement of
equal protection rights. But their primary faith was in Congress. They
wanted to have the power to enact laws such as the Civil Rights Acts
and the Ku Klux Klan Act. The fact that they chose to enact such laws
on the heels of the ratification of Section Five suggests that they
thought they were giving themselves broad enforcement authority.
Thus, the Boerne Court is correct to try to learn some lessons from the
post-ratification debate, but it gets those lessons backwards. A Con-
gress that wanted to have the authority to enact the Ku Klux Klan Act
would not have wanted Section Five to be interpreted narrowly.
CONCLUSION
An investigation into the history of Section Five cannot support
the narrow interpretation of this provision created by the Supreme
Court in City of Boerne v. Flores. There is no evidence that the "neces-
sary and proper" language was dropped from Section Five to assuage
the federalists. The Congress which ratified Section Five was a con-
temporary of the Congress which passed the Ku Klux Klan Act, and
thereby understood itself to have power to remedy potential, but not
actual, constitutional violations by state actors. The Boerne Court has
turned that piece of history on its head, assuming that the opponents
rather than the proponents of the Ku Klux Klan Act controlled Con-
gress in both 1868 and 1871.
History cannot provide us with precise answers as to the exact test
that should exist under Section Five for the scope of Congress's
authority. But history can demonstrate that the Boerne Court was too
narrow in its determination of the proper role for the Court. The his-
159 For a critique of the Court's Section Five standard, see generally Colker, supra note
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tory of the Fourteenth Amendment does not confirm the remedial,
rather than substantive, nature of Section Five despite the Supreme
Court's argument to the contrary.160 If the Rehnquist Court is to use
history as a guidepost in interpreting the Constitution then it has an
obligation to conduct a fuller and more balanced historical inquiry.
160 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
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